4 Mkhize 2008 , 42. 5 Eze 2010 , 184-185. 6 Eze 2010 have been abstracted from their social context. Rather it is concerned with the phenomenological or lived experiences of the people in question.4
However, unlike Mkhize, the aim here is to participate in de/reconceptualising (and/or confirming), not some representative of the vast pool of Western academic ethics, but the discourse on the ethics actually attached to ubuntu itself on the basis of the lived experience of a particular group of people. Eze suggests that virtues attached to ubuntu, or more specifically their application, are to be reflected upon as internal to "practices of […] communities", as they may "mean different things to different historical cultures, context [sic] and communities". Even if the core concept was the same/similar in different Bantu languages, the "rules guiding social intercourse" and the application of the concept depend on the social setting and may be different, for instance, among the Shona and the Zulu.5 In the context of this study, the social setting is not defined by one ethnicity but rather the encounter of several ethnic groups. Hence, the patterns of practice and the rules guiding it that emerge in analysis reflect a context defined by migration -and ministry. So, listening to the voices at the cmm, I set out to understand ubuntu "as an emergent tradition within a particular historical context" and, more specifically, an evolving (even if not new) ethic in this context.6 I begin this chapter by scrutinizing four interrelated virtues -recognition, respect, care and help -that were reflected in the interviewees' thinking of the ideal way of relating to other human beings. One could say that these virtues mark the direction of morality: towards other people. The list of virtues is not to be understood as exhaustive, and at times they might require or entail the acknowledgment of other related virtues, such as compassion, solidarity or kindness. The manifestation or lack of these virtues were described in ways that exposed an expected link between the character of the person (or group) and their behaviour. The expectation of this link explains people's uneasiness with the situation in which the virtues hardly flourished. However, the lack could be explained by contextual matters that took (some) pressure off one's own or other people's character.
Therefore, I then turn to examine how the lack of the actualization of these virtues in the relationship can be understood. I sketch limiting rules and limiting structural elements that influenced the relationship between the groups.
